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THE MARITAL/SEPARATE PROPERTY
DISTINCTION IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA-REVISITED
Mark London*
and Barbara K. Dougherty**
The District of Columbia's enactment of the Marriage and Divorce Act of
1977' (MDA) accepted the principle that marriage is a productive partner-
ship composed of two equal venturers. Hailed as a giant step toward equity,
the MDA smashed the idol of legal title and banned worship to the wage
earner. The mandate of the new law focused attention on efforts toward the
marital union rather than isolated individual enterprises. In order to accom-
plish those aims, the District of Columbia City Council appended a very
long arm to the MDA, allowing the courts to consider distribution of such a
wide range of property as to nearly abolish the marital/separate property
distinction.2
* B.A. 1974, Amherst College; J.D. 1979, George Washington University. Mr.
London, a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Laxalt, Washington, Perito, and
Dubuc, is co-author of The Marital/Separate Property Distinction in the District of Columbia,
29 CATH. U.L. REV. 939 (1980).
** B.A. 1981, State University of New York at Stony Brook; J.D. 1984, Georgetown
University Law Center. Ms. Dougherty (nee Stokke) is an associate in the Washington D.C.
law firm of Laxalt, Washington, Perito, and Dubuc and served as a law clerk to the Honorable
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly on the Superior Court for the District of Columbia.
1. D.C. Law 1-107, 1977 D.C. Stat. 114 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
901 to -923 (1981)).
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1981). Section 16-910 provides:
Upon the entry of a final decree of annulment or divorce in the absence of a valid
ante-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement or a decree of legal separation disposing the
property of the spouses, the court shall:
(a) assign to each party his or her sole and separate property acquired prior to
the marriage, and his or her sole and separate property acquired during the marriage
by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and any increase thereof, or property acquired in
exchange therefor; and
(b) distribute all other property accumulated during the marriage, regardless of
whether title is held individually or by the parties in a form of joint tenancy or ten-
ancy by the entireties, in a manner that is equitable, just and reasonable, after consid-
ering all relevant factors including, but not limited to: the duration of the marriage,
any prior marriage of either party, the age, health, occupation, amount and sources
of income, vocational skills, employability, assets, debts, and needs of each of the
parties, provisions for the custody of minor children, whether the distribution is in
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On its face, the MDA clearly distinguishes between marital and separate
property. Sole and separate property includes property brought into the
marriage, inherited property, gifted property, and increases in these assets
and exchanges for them.' The MDA treats all other property as marital,
subject to distribution based on a nonexclusive list of factors.4 Moreover,
the MDA creates a strong presumption that property is marital and places
the burden of proof on the party claiming otherwise.'
Nearly ten years after its enactment and eight years after one of the au-
thors and a colleague first analyzed its provisions,6 very little case law exists
to instruct superior court judges in their application of the MDA. Of the
36,122 divorces filed in the District of Columbia from 1977 through 1986,7
approximately twenty have produced appellate decisions addressing prop-
erty distribution pursuant to the MDA.8 There are numerous possible ex-
planations for this paucity of case law. First, the very lack of precedent
impedes likely precedent setters; that is, with so much uncertainty very few
litigants are willing to "bet the store" in an area with so few judicially cre-
ated landmarks.
Second, litigation continues to be prohibitively expensive. Few can afford
the financial demands of trial, the cost of appeal, and the possibility of a trial
on remand. With a relaxed attitude toward awarding attorneys' fees
lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisi-
tion of assets and income. The court shall also consider each party's contribution to
the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, dissipation or depreciation in value of the
assets subject to distribution under this subsection, and each party's contribution as a
homemaker or to the family unit.
Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. § 16-910(b); see also McCree v. McCree, 464 A.2d 922, 928 (D.C. 1983) (noting
that list of § 910(b) factors is nonexclusive); Turpin v. Turpin, 403 A.2d 1144 (D.C. 1979)
(same).
5. See Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139, 1142-44 (D.C. 1979).
6. See Gordon & London, The Marital/Separate Property Distinction in the District of
Columbia, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 939 (1980).
7. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 78 (1986); DISTRICT OF CO-
LUMBIA COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 74 (1982).
8. See Carter v. Carter, 516 A.2d 917 (D.C. 1986); Bowser v. Bowser, 515 A.2d 1128
(D.C. 1986); Gassaway v. Gassaway, 489 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1985); Miller v. Miller, 487 A.2d
1156 (D.C. 1985); Gabrielian v. Gabrielian, 473 A.2d 847 (D.C. 1984); Turner v. Taylor, 471
A.2d 1010 (D.C. 1984); Barbour v. Barbour, 464 A.2d 915 (D.C. 1983); McCree, 464 A.2d at
922; Powell v. Powell, 457 A.2d 391 (D.C. 1983); Hairston v. Hairston, 454 A.2d 1369 (D.C.
1983); Broadwater v. Broadwater, 449 A.2d 286 (D.C. 1982); Hackes v. Hackes, 446 A.2d 396
(D.C. 1982); Darling v. Darling, 444 A.2d 20 (D.C. 1982); Leftwich v. Leftwich, 442 A.2d 139
(D.C. 1982); Murville v. Murville, 433 A.2d 1106 (D.C. 1981); Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d
1085 (D.C. 1980); Brice v. Brice, 411 A.2d 340 (D.C. 1980); Hemily, 403 A.2d at 1139; Turpin,
403 A.2d at 1144; Benvenuto v. Benvenuto, 389 A.2d 795 (D.C. 1978).
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pendente lite,9 the superior court has stripped away the advantage of one
party being able to litigate until he or she has exhausted the other's
resources.
Third, few parties have the time or the emotional fortitude to persist
through the time-consuming process of litigating a trial, arguing an appeal,
waiting for the rendering of an opinion, and relitigating if a remand is or-
dered. Sooner or later litigants undoubtedly conclude that this phase of
their lives should end.
Fourth, an appeal often will be an exercise in futility. Even if a party is
successful in convincing the court of appeals that the trial judge erred in
making the marital/separate property distinction, on remand the trial judge
can award the same amount of property to each party, although the "mix"
may differ. For example, suppose that a trial judge split ownership of a mar-
ital residence and a small office building, finding that both were martial
property. Even though one spouse might successfully convince the court of
appeals that the office building was sole and separate property, on remand,
the trial judge could award the entire marital residence to the other spouse.
Finally, superior court judges can easily immunize their original decisions
against reversal by exercising wide discretion in distribution. Take the ex-
ample of the husband who claims that most of the parties' investments are
his sole and separate property. Rather than tackle the legal classification
issue, the trial judge can abide by the presumption that property is marital
and classify the assets as marital under the MDA. The court then can apply
the list of factors set forth in the MDA and award this property to the hus-
band. 10 Thus, although the husband wanted the court to legally classify the
assets as his sole and separate property, he will not appeal the decision be-
cause the court ultimately awarded the assets to him. The wife, who won
the legal classification battle but has little property to show for it, has no
appealable issue except to challenge the trial court's wide latitude in distrib-
uting the marital assets.1 1
The consequences of this continued paucity of case law are less speculative
than the reasons for its existence. Because so many important issues relating
9. See, e.g., Darling, 444 A.2d at 23.
10. See, e.g., Powell, 457 A.2d at 391. In Powell, the trial court found that shares of stock
acquired by the wife after separation but prior to divorce were martial property, but neverthe-
less awarded them to the wife because "the equities are much stronger after separation." Id. at
393. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the award. Id.
11. See, e.g., Gassaway, 489 A.2d at 1075 (court has broad discretion in distributing mari-
tal property); Barbour, 464 A.2d at 922 (same); Powell, 457 A.2d at 393 (same); Hairston, 454
A.2d at 1371 (same); Broadwater, 449 A.2d at 287 (same); Brice, 411 A.2d at 344 (same);
Turpin, 403 A.2d at 1146-47 ("court's discretion under the new statute is at least as broad as it
was under the old").
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Catholic University Law Review
to the marital/separate property distinction under the MDA remain unde-
cided in the District of Columbia, superior court judges have no precedent to
guide them in interpreting the MDA and applying it in new situations. For
guidance, judges must look to the precedents of other jurisdictions. This is
not entirely an unfounded exercise, however, because the District modeled
the MDA on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA),"2 which
eight states have adopted and others have used as a model.13
This Article identifies those basic marital property issues that remain un-
resolved in the District of Columbia. By examining the approaches other
jurisdictions have taken in resolving similar issues, this Article offers practi-
tioners in the District of Columbia guidance that is consistent with the
MDA and its spirit of equating a marriage with a productive partnership.
I. PROPERTY OWNED PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE AND IMPROVED/
MAINTAINED WITH MARITAL FUNDS
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not yet decided whether
property owned by one spouse prior to the marriage and improved or main-
tained with marital funds qualifies as (a) the sole and separate property of
the spouse who brought the property into the marriage, (b) marital property
subject to equitable distribution, or (c) part separate and part marital prop-
erty. In resolving this open question, the court must determine whether to
apply the "source of funds" rule or the "inception of title" rule.
Under the source of funds rule, "the character of property as separate or
marital is in proportion to the amount of separate and marital funds or effort
devoted to its acquisition or improvement."' 4 A single asset can be a hybrid
under the source of funds rule, with a portion classified as sole and separate
property' 5 and the remainder, that proportion consisting of contributions of
marital funds, classified as marital property 6 subject to distribution. In con-
trast to the source of funds rule is the inception of title rule. According to
12. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 94 U.L.A. 147 (1973) [hereinafter
UMDA]; see also Barbour, 464 A.2d at 919-20 (discussing similar statutory provisions in other
jurisdictions).
13. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-311 to -339 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-101
and -113, 14-10-101 to -133 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 101-802 (Smith-Hurd 1980);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.010, 403.110-.350 (Mitchie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 518.002-.66 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.300-.415 (Vernon's
1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1-101 to -404, 40-4-101 to -221 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 26.09.010-.902 (1980 & Supp. 1988); see also 9A U.L.A. 147 (West 1987).
14. Krauskopf, The Transmutation and Source of Funds Rules in Division of Marital Prop-
erty, 50 Mo. L. REV. 759, 768 (1985).
15. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910(a) (1981).
16. See id. § 16-910(b).
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this theory, the court classifies property as either separate or marital at the
time the owner takes title.'" The basic difference between these theories
stems from their definition of when one "acquires" property. Under the in-
ception of title rule, property is acquired when one has the right to obtain
title."8 In contrast, the source of funds rule recognizes acquisition as an
ongoing process, especially where one pays for property in installments.' 9
A. Inception of Title Rule
Under the inception of title rule, property purchased or received before
marriage is separate property and retains its classification despite post-mar-
riage enhancements and appreciation.2 ° The inception of title rule, an older
and more traditional rule than the source of funds rule, has undergone modi-
fication over time.2' States that use the inception of title rule today still
insist that the appreciation and enhancement in separate property due to
contributions of community property retain the separate classification but
recognize a spousal right to recompense for contributions, under either an
equitable lien theory or under a right to reimbursement theory.
Potthoff v. Potthoff22 illustrated the equitable lien theory. The Court of
Appeals of Arizona recognized a wife's lien on property acquired by her
husband prior to their marriage. In Potthoff, the husband had acquired the
right to purchase two parcels of land prior to the marriage. 23 The couple
used community funds to complete the purchase of one parcel and to build
and renovate a shopping center on the second parcel.24 The husband and
the wife signed the loan for the shopping center. 25 The parties listed the
second parcel as community property in their federal income tax return.26
The court held that applications of community funds to separate property
did not alter the basic community property principle that the status of sepa-
rate property may only be altered by agreement or by operation of law.2 7
Thus, while both parcels, along with the increases and improvements, re-
17. Krauskopf, supra note 14, at 768.
18. See, e.g., Potthoff v. Potthoff, 128 Ariz. 557, 661, 627 P.2d 708, 712 (1981).
19. See, e.g., Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982).
20. Krauskopf, supra note 14, at 768-69.
21. See id. at 770.
22. 128 Ariz. at 564, 627 P.2d at 715.
23. Id. at 559, 627 P.2d at 710.
24. Id. at 560, 627 P.2d at 711.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 561, 627 P.2d at 712.
27. Id. at 562, 627 P.2d at 713. However, the court noted that in cases where the commu-
nity and separate aspects of property became so commingled that the identity of the property
was lost, the separate money (but not real property) would be treated as transmuted into com-
munity property. Id., 627 P.2d at 713.
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mained separate property, the community had a lien on each parcel for the
payments, improvements, and renovations made with community funds.2"
The profits or increase in value of the second parcel that were attributable to
the husband's community efforts in making the shopping center profitable
were, however, community property, unless the husband could show that
the increase resulted not from his effort but rather, from the inherent nature
of the separate property.2 9
Villarreal v. Villarreal, 30 offers an example of the right of reimbursement
theory. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals recognized a right of reimburse-
ment equal to the enhanced value of the separate property improved with
community funds.3 The trial court characterized as entirely marital prop-
erty a home which the husband acquired several weeks before marriage.3 2
The court of civil appeals reversed, invoking the inception of title rule, but
noted that the community's contribution to improvements, purchase, or re-
duction of debt associated with the separate property is reimbursable.33 In
Jensen v. Jensen, the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed this approach with
respect to appreciation in value of spousal property owned prior to mar-
riage.34 Under such circumstances, the rule compensates the community for
the value of time and effort expended by one party to enhance the value of
the separate estate of the other, excluding the amount reasonably necessary
to manage and preserve the separate estate. 35 Thus, the court may deduct
any amount from the reimbursement award already received by the commu-
nity as remuneration for such time and effort, including salaries, bonuses,
dividends, or fringe benefits.3 6
B. Source of Funds Rule
While the majority of community property states still employ the incep-
tion of title rule, it is clearly the minority rule today in other states. The
source of funds rule prevails in most jurisdictions, and the trend in common
law equitable distribution states is toward its adoption. The rule recognizes
28. Id. at 564, 627 P.2d at 715.
29. Id. at 565, 627 P.2d at 715.
30. 618 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
31. Id. at 101.
32. Id. at 100.
33. Id. at 101; see also Fisher v. Fisher, 86 Idaho 131, 383 P.2d 840 (1963).
34. 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
35. Id. at 109.
36. Id.; cf Potthoffv. Potthoff, 128 Ariz. 557, 564, 627 P.2d 708, 715 (1981) (an increase




acquisition of property over time as a "dynamic, ongoing process."37 There-
fore, "to the extent that the amounts of marital and separate sources are
ascertainable, the value of the property will have a dual character-part
marital and part separate in proportion to the marital and separate
contributions." 3
8
Three common law equitable distribution states recently have adopted the
source of funds rule, beginning with Harper v. Harper,39 where the Mary-
land Court of Appeals rejected the inception of title rule in favor of the
source of funds rule, focusing on an interpretation of the term "acquired" in
the applicable Maryland statute. In Harper, the husband bought land under
an installment contract prior to the marriage. He continued to make pay-
ments on the contract during the marriage and later built a home on the
property for use as the marital residence.'" Although the husband at all
times retained record title, the wife's name appeared on the mortgage. 41 The
husband claimed that he made all payments associated with the home, in-
cluding payments on the installment contract, as well as construction and
maintenance costs. 42 The wife countered that the couple financed the home
with proceeds from the sale of the couple's previous home, for which her
mother had provided the down payment.43
At trial, the court concluded that the parties presented insufficient evi-
dence to show the exact source and extent of funds used for payments for the
realty, and construction and maintenance of the marital residence." The
trial court held that both the lot and the residence were marital property and
ordered a sale, with an equal division of the proceeds.45 On appeal, the
Maryland Court of Appeals addressed two issues: first, whether the real
property, when purchased under an installment contract and partially paid
for before marriage, was marital property; and second, whether the marital
residence constructed on such realty during the marriage was also marital
property.46
The court rejected the inception of title rule, concluding that the word
"acquired" in the Maryland statute meant "the on-going process of making
37. See Krauskopf, supra note 14, at 768.
38. Id.
39. 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982).
40. Id. at 57, 448 A.2d at 918.




45. Id. at 58-59, 448 A.2d at 918-19.
46. Id. at 55, 448 A.2d at 917.
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payment for property."4 7 Therefore, the source of funds doctrine, with its
emphasis on ascertaining the traceability of expenditures made over time,
applied.48 The court remanded the case with the directive that the trial
court determine the source of funds contributed to both the lot and the
house.4 9 The court would determine the marital nature of the funds based
on the ratio that the marital funds bore to the total investment. 50 That pro-
portion would then be subject to equitable distribution. 5' Harper provides
significant guidance to District of Columbia courts because the Maryland
equitable distribution statute is similar to section 16-910 of the MDA.52 In
addition, District of Columbia courts have sometimes looked to Maryland in
construing the MDA's equitable distribution provision.5 3
Similarly, in Hall v. Hall, 54 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine consid-
ered whether nonmarital property, which the couple renovated and ex-
panded with marital funds, lost its classification as separate property and
became marital property." The relevant Maine statute, like the applicable
MDA provision, excludes from the definition of marital property "[t]he in-
crease in value of property acquired prior to the marriage."5 6
Based upon this language, the husband in Hall argued that the improve-
ments were nonmarital property, and urged the court to follow the inception
of title rule.5 7 The wife asked the court to adopt the transmutation doctrine
and contended that use of marital funds to improve the separate property
changed the entire parcel's character to marital property.58
The court rejected both positions, instead relying on the source of funds
rule.59 It found that the money spent on the house represented an invest-
ment of marital funds.' Therefore, the court reasoned, if it denied a return
on that investment to the marital estate, it would encourage spouses to divert
marital funds toward improvements on separate property. 6' This would cre-
47. Id. at 80, 448 A.2d at 929.
48. Id., 448 A.2d at 929.
49. Id. at 82, 448 A.2d at 930.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See MD. FAM. LAW §§ 8-201 to -213 (1984 & Supp. 1987).
53. Barbour v. Barbour, 446 A.2d 915 (D.C. 1985) (pensions are marital property);
Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139, 1143 n.5 (D.C. 1979) (marital property cannot be trans-
formed into separate property by interspousal gift).
54. 462 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1983).
55. Id. at 1180-82.
56. 19 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(2)(E) (West 1981).
57. Hall, 462 A.2d at 1180.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1181.
61. Id. at 1181-82.
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ate an opportunity for the more sophisticated spouse, or the spouse with
legal counsel, to take advantage of the other.6 2
Further, in accord with the Maryland court's approach in Harper, the
Hall court interpreted the statutory term "acquired" as an ongoing process
of making payment on property, rather than as a final and arbitrary date
that a legal obligation to purchase arose.6 3 Applying this definition, the
court held that the husband had not "acquired" the renovation and improve-
ments before the marriage."
In Hoffman v. Hoffman,6" the Supreme Court of Missouri followed the
trend among common-law, equitable-jurisdiction states and adopted the
source of funds rule. More significantly, in so doing, it abandoned a long
line of Missouri cases upholding the inception of title rule.6 6 The dispute in
Hoffman concerned the status of corporate stock held solely in the hus-
band's name.67 Prior to marriage, he had acquired 256 shares representing
sixteen to seventeen percent of shares outstanding in a close corporation.6 8
Subsequent to the marriage, the corporation purchased and retired 858
shares belonging to the husband's father, increasing the husband's interest to
35.3%.69 Twelve years later, the husband gave away thirty-three shares, re-
ducing his interest to 29.5 %.70
The wife argued that the increase in ownership interest and value of the
corporate stock was marital property. She reasoned that redemption of
stock transformed her husband's stock from separate to marital property
because her efforts and marital money contributed to the redemption and the
stock's increase in value.7 '
The court disagreed with the general proposition that the increase in own-
ership interest constituted an "acquisition" during coverture, which had the
effect of transforming a portion or all of the husband's stock into marital
62. Id. at 1182-83 (citing Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marital Dissolution, 43 Mo. L.
REV. 157, 184 (1978)).
63. Id. at 1182 (citing Tibbets v. Tibbets, 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979)).
64. Id.
65. 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
66. See, e.g., Busby v. Busby, 669 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Whitenton v.
Whitenton, 659 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Bishop v. Bishop, 658 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); Puckett v. Puckett, 632 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Ravenscroft v. Raven-
scroft, 585 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976); Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); cf Sumners v. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d
720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (en banc) (retroactive application of Hoffman).
67. 676 S.W.2d at 820.
68. Id. at 821.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id at 822.
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property. Rather, it characterized the new ownership interest as an ex-
change for an interest owned prior to marriage.7 2 Moreover, the court, cit-
ing a lack of evidence, rejected the wife's claim that funds used to repurchase
the shares came from the husband's salary, which was marital property.73
Finally, the court addressed the wife's argument that the stock's increased
value resulted in part from her efforts. The court framed the key issue as
"whether the stock was wholly 'acquired' prior to the marriage, ' noting
that the wife did not contest that the original 256 shares belonged to the
husband. The court further recognized that resolution of this issue de-
pended upon whether it interpreted the word "acquire" from the perspective
of the inception of title rule or the source of funds rule. Upon reviewing the
principles of each theory, and taking cognizance that the inception of title
rule was losing favor as the less equitable of the two,7 5 the court reversed the
trial court's application of the inception of title doctrine and followed the
source of funds rule.76
C. The District of Columbia Rule
Although common law equitable distribution jurisdictions clearly disfavor
the inception of title rule, and despite the fact that its fortunes continue to
wane even in community property states, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals demurred when it had the opportunity to adopt the source of funds
rule. Instead, the court adopted a rule, not followed in other jurisdictions,
that has performed inadequately when applied to the wide variety of prop-
erty distribution cases.
In Turpin v. Turpin, 77 decided shortly after the enactment of the MDA,78
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed whether a jointly
funded, jointly owned, and jointly occupied apartment was distributable as
marital property. The bulk of the payment for the apartment came from the
sale of a home that the husband had owned prior to the marriage. 79 Along
with the house proceeds, each spouse contributed cash toward the apart-
ment, which they purchased as joint owners two years after marriage and
72. Id.
73. Id. at 823.
74. Id. (citing Krauskopf, Marital Property at Martial Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. REV. 157,
180 (1978)).
75. Id. at 824 (citing Krauskopf, Marital Property at Martial Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. REV.
157, 180 (1978)).
76. Id. at 825.
77. 403 A.2d 1144 (D.C. 1979).
78. For a discussion of the previous Act, see Green & Long, The Real and Illusory
Changes of the 1977 Marriage and Divorce Act, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 469 (1978).
79. Turpin, 403 A.2d at 1147.
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lived in together for seven years.80 The superior court judge held that
neither the apartment, nor a bond, purchased with the proceeds from the
sale of the husband's previous house, were his sole and separate property and
distributed both pursuant to section 16-910(b)."'
On appeal, the husband contended that he could trace 84.73% of the
apartment's purchase price to the proceeds of the house.82 Therefore, he
argued, the court should have considered 84.73% of the apartment to be his
sole and separate property.8 3 The court of appeals rejected this proposal.
An important factor in the court's decision was that both the apartment and
the bond were jointly titled. The court noted: "[i]f and when the property is
put in joint names-for whatever reason-then it is no longer exempted [as
sole and separate property] under subsection (a) but rather falls within sub-
section (b) under which the trial court is to determine how the property is to
be distributed.",8 4 Moreover, the court held that "[t]here is no room under
subsection (a) for apportioning property or tracing funds."8" In light of the
pronouncement that it would not apportion or trace property under section
16-910(a), it appeared that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had
declined to follow the source of funds rule.
One year later, however, the court of appeals indicated a willingness to
retreat from Turpin's categorical rejection of the source of funds approach.
In Brice v. Brice,86 the issue was whether a spouse's property, acquired in a
manner enumerated in section 16-910(a), could be treated as property sub-
ject to distribution under section 16-910(b). In Brice, the wife contended
that she had an equitable interest in the marital home because she had made
substantial contributions to the household budget.87 The husband had ac-
quired the house shortly before marriage, held record title, and had made all
the mortgage payments.88 Addressing the wife's argument in dicta, the
court noted that "disproportionately high" payments by one spouse for
home maintenance and household expenses could create an equitable inter-





84. Id. at 1146.
85. Id. at 1147. The husband's argument regarding the bond was also rejected. All of the
funds for the bond came from the sale of the husband's home. Id The bond was jointly titled,
both spouses had dominion and control over it, it was kept in a jointly controlled safety deposit
box, and the interest earned from it was deposited into their joint checking account. Id.
86. 411 A.2d 340 (D.C. 1980).
87. Id. at 343.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court stated:
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
Thus, Brice leaves open the possibility of conversion of sole and separate
property under section 16-910(a) into marital property under section 16-
910(b). The decision does not, however, state whether a spouse could con-
vert a portion of an asset.
D. The Solution
A review of the source of funds rule leads to the conclusion that the Dis-
trict of Columbia should adopt a form of the source of funds rule because the
rule is consistent with the concept of marriage as a partnership. The incep-
tion of title rule encourages inefficiency, motivating a spouse to use marital
income to improve only his or her separate property. Under the source of
funds rule, each spouse can retain his or her separate property, both spouses
benefit from the partnership income, and neither spouse receives a reward
for diverting funds toward his or her separate property.
In order to adopt a workable scheme, however, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia need not overrule Turpin and specifically adopt the
source of funds rule. A recent Virginia case, Smoot v. Smoot, ' illustrates
that the individual and the partnership can receive proper credit without
utilizing the source of funds rule. In Smoot, the parties began construction
of a new home two years after their marriage. 91 Of the $45,000 down pay-
ment, $20,000 came from the husband's settlement for injuries he suffered in
an accident that occurred two years before the marriage.92 The trial court
held that the husband could claim a $20,000 credit for the funds that he
contributed to the house.93 The wife appealed, arguing that the court imper-
missibly applied the source of funds rule and classified the house as part
marital and part sole and separate. 94
Although the state supreme court agreed with the wife that the Virginia
statute95 did not permit the application of the source of funds doctrine, it
nevertheless held that awarding a credit was consistent with the statute. 96
even in the absence of an antenuptial agreement, we assume for the sake of argument
(but do not decide) that disproportionately high payments for home maintenance and
household expenses by one spouse may create an equitable interest in real property
acquired prior to the marriage and held in the name of the other spouse.
Id.
90. 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
91. Id. at 437, 357 S.E.2d at 729.
92. Id., 357 S.E.2d at 729.
93. Id. at 438, 357 S.E.2d at 729.
94. Id. at 439, 357 S.E.2d at 730.
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (1983). This statute was amended in 1984, 1985 and
1986. See infra note 164.
96. Smoot, 233 Va. at 442, 357 S.E.2d at 732.
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Moreover, the court permitted the use of the source of funds doctrine as an
analogy, even though the court had specifically rejected that theory.97
Smoot is useful precedent even though the Virginia statute, unlike the Dis-
trict of Columbia statute, specifically enables the court to make a monetary
award. 98 It suggests that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
could adopt a method of crediting a spouse for separate contributions to the
marriage, and at the same time reward the partnership, without apportion-
ing section 16-910(a) property and, thus, overruling Turpin.
II. TRANSMUTATION-JOINTLY TITLED AND COMMINGLED PROPERTY
The transmutation theory recognizes that the intent of the parties can
change the characterization of property.99 As noted above, the District of
Columbia courts have shown little flexibility regarding property classifica-
tions. Generally, the courts view property as either entirely marital or en-
tirely separate."°° This rigid, "all or nothing" approach is evident in
decisions regarding transmutation and has ultimately resulted in rigid rules
that render evidence of intent virtually meaningless. Furthermore, these
rules fly in the face of the MDA, which attempted to abolish distinctions
based solely on title.101
Joint titling, one method of transmutation, was addressed in Turpin v.
Turpin,o 2 where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
whenever separate property is put in joint names, it automatically becomes
marital property.10 3 Numerous state courts have adopted a variation of the
Turpin rule and have held that the act of transferring a nonmarital asset
from one spouse to both spouses jointly evidences an intent that the property
become part of the marital estate.'°4 In those states, however, joint titling
97. Id.; see also Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 228, 361 S.E.2d 364 (1987) (asset must be
classified either as marital or as separate; not as a hybrid).
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(2)(D) (1983).
99. In re Marriage of Rogers, 85 Ill. 2d 217, 422 N.E. 2d 635 (1981)); Carter v. Carter, 419
A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980); Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Bonnell v.
Bonnell, 117 Wis. 2d 241, 344 N.W. 2d 123 (1984); Krauskopf, supra note 14, at 190-91.
100. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
101. For a discussion of the difference between the MDA and its predecessor, see Gordon
& London, supra note 6.
102. 403 A.2d 1144 (D.C. 1979).
103. Id. at 1146. The court stated, "If and when the [sole and separate] property is put
into joint names-for whatever reason-then it is no longer exempted under subsection (a)."
Id. (emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., Battiste v. Battiste, 135 Ariz. 470, 662 P.2d 145 (1983); Willyard v. Willyard,
719 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848 (R.I. 1986); Bonnell v.
Bonnell, 117 Wis. 2d 241, 344 N.W.2d 123 (1984). But see Griffin v. Griffin, 415 N.W. 2d 763
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (placing proceeds of sale of nonmarital property into jointly titled ac-
count did not transform it into marital property).
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does not operate as a rigid rule. Instead, it is a presumption that can be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the transferor did not intend
that ownership of the property be transferred to the marital estate.10 5
An early decision addressing the issue of joint titling is Conrad v. Bow-
ers. 16 In Conrad, the court held that Missouri's newly enacted marital
property statute did not overrule the common law presumption that jointly
titled property is marital because it evidences an intent to gift property to the
other spouse.10 7 Other states have adopted the Missouri courts' logic."10
A recent Illinois decision, In re Marriage of Guerra, 109 illustrates use of
evidence of nondonative intent to overcome the presumption that separate
property transferred to joint names becomes marital property. 1 0 In Guerra,
the court applied a number of factors to determine whether the spouse had
rebutted the presumption of marital property. The factors included the size
of the gift relative to the entire estate, which spouse paid the purchase price,
which spouse exercised control and management over the property, whether
improvements and taxes were paid with separate money, when the asset was
purchased, and how the parties handled their prior financial dealings with
each other.' Based on an analysis of these factors, the court held that the
husband rebutted the presumption that he intended to give the proceeds of
his liquidated company to his wife, even though he deposited the funds in
the parties' joint checking account.' 2 The court noted that the company
stock was the husband's only asset when the parties married and that he
alone used the joint account." 3 Moreover, the husband used the funds to
purchase a house that he titled solely in his name and had purchased a sec-
ond house after the parties separated." 4 Finally, when the husband had
intended to give property to the wife in the past, his donative intent was
105. In re Marriage of Guerra, 153 Ill. App. 3d 550, 505 N.E.2d 748 (husband rebutted
presumption where he alone used assets in jointly titled account, first house purchased with
proceeds was titled solely in his name, second house was not purchased until after parties
separated, and evidence showed that when husband had made previous gifts to wife, his inten-
tions were manifested clearly), appeal denied, 116 Ill. 2d 554, 515 N.E.2d 107 (1987).
106. 553 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
107. Id. at 622. But see Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256, 477 A.2d 1163 (1983) (statute
changed common law presumption of gift arising from joint titling).
108. See, e.g., Battiste, 135 Ariz. at 470, 662 P.2d at 145; Willyard, 719 S.W.2d at 91;
Quinn, 512 A.2d at 848; Bonnell, 117 Wis. 2d at 241, 344 N.W.2d at 123. But see Griffith, 415
N.W.2d at 763 (act of placing proceeds of sale of nonmarital property into jointly titled ac-
count did not transform it into marital property).
109. 153 Il1. App. 3d 550, 505 N.E.2d 748 (1987).
110. Id. at 558-59, 505 N.E.2d at 754.
111. Id. at 556-59, 505 N.E.2d at 752-54.






The Minnesota courts take a slightly different view of joint titling. In
Montgomery v. Montgomery,1" 6 the court held that the wife's transfer of title
in the parties' home from herself individually to joint tenancy with her hus-
band did not transmute her sole and separate interest in the home into a
marital interest. 1 7 The court examined Minnesota's marital property stat-
ute and determined the classification of property by the date of acquisition
and not by title."' Under these circumstances, the court held that it would
be inconsistent with the statute to allow mere transfer of title to transform
property. "9 The court reasoned that because "the legislature ha[d] provided
definitions of marital and non-marital property, and ha[d] used those defini-
tions as a basis for dividing property in a dissolution . . . allowing the
changes in title to transform the classification of property would defeat the
legislature's scheme for division."12
However, the court did not state that joint titling did not evidence any
intent to transmute property. It merely stated that joint ownership is "not
dispositive" and specifically noted that "additional factors of long term mar-
riage or transfers by gift might compel a different result."''
Both the Missouri rule, as set forth in Conrad and the Minnesota rule as
outlined in Montgomery, are sensible and either could be adopted in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Several equitable distribution jurisdictions have adopted
the Missouri rule, and have applied it after making the marital/separate
115. Id. at 553, 505 N.E.2d at 750.
116. 358 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
117. Id at 172.
118. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 518.54-.66. Section 518.54(5) states:
"Marital property" means property, real or personal, including vested public or pri-
vate pension plan benefits or rights, acquired by the parties, or either of them, to a
dissolution, legal separation, or annulment proceeding at any time during.., which
the parties were living together as husband and wife under a purported marriage
relationship which is annulled in an annulment proceeding. All property acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage and before a decree of legal separation is
presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or by
the spouses in a form of coownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
tenancy by the entirety, or community property. Each spouse shall be deemed to
have a common ownership in marital property that vests not later than the time of
the entry of the decree in a proceeding for dissolution or annulment. The extent of
the vested interest shall be determined and made final by the court pursuant to sec-
tion 518.58. The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the
property is non-marital property.
Id § 518.54(5).
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property distinctions under the source of funds rule. 122 The Minnesota rule
is particularly appealing, because both the Minnesota and District of Colum-
bia statutes derived from the UMDA.
The most important aspect of both rules is that they avoid inflexible, auto-
matic transmutation as exhibited in Turpin and instead employ a rule of
reason. Under either rule, a spouse, like a partner in any joint venture,
would not lose his or her separate property simply because he or she be-
comes a partner in the joint venture of marriage. Conversely, the spouse/
partner who contributes to the partnership reaps the benefit of his or her
efforts.
Another method of transmutation is commingling, which the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals briefly addressed in Darling v. Darling.' 2' In
Darling, the husband argued that the court erred in distributing antiques as
section 910(b) property because they were corporate rather than personal
property. 124 The court stated that "[c]onsidering the commingling of busi-
ness and personal finances and the fact many of the antiques were purchased
with funds earned through the parties' joint efforts, it was proper to dis-
tribute the items pursuant to section 16-910(b)."' 125 Citing Turpin, the court
noted that the connection between the antiques and the premarital property
was "tenuous" and tracing was impermissible.' 26
The District of Columbia courts' reluctance to adopt the source of funds
rule may lead to inequitable results because it forces courts to adopt a per se
approach-property either is marital or separate-rather than a rule of rea-
son. For example, a husband may establish a bank account with $10,000 of
funds from an unidentifiable source, which, under applicable presumptions,
means the money is marital property. In the next three years, the husband
deposits $600,000 of inherited funds into the account, clearly sole and sepa-
rate property. However, under the current statutory framework, all
purchases (i.e., exchanges) from the account would be marital property. In
other words, any commingling between the two types of property, no matter
how slight, converts sole and separate property to marital property without
offering special consideration for the disproportionate efforts in the parent-
ing of the property. This is clearly an unfair result.
In resolving this dilemma, judges should be guided by two recent Minne-
sota decisions. Because the Minnesota marital property statute's definition
122. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1983).
123. 444 A.2d 20 (D.C. 1982).
124. Id. at 22-23.
125. Id. at 25.
126. Id.
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of "non-marital property"' 27 is very similar to the definition of "sole and
separate property" in section 16-910(a) of the MDA, the Minnesota cases
present persuasive authority.
In Nash v. Nash, 128 the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the trial
court erred in not awarding the wife her nonmarital investment of $5,142 in
remodeling the parties' residence. 129 Although the trial court found that the
wife had met her tracing requirement by producing receipts demonstrating
that she invested the money in the remodeling immediately after inheriting
$6,600, it held that the inherited money lost its separate identity because she
commingled it in the joint account used to pay family expenses. 130 The
court of appeals disagreed, stating, "[t]he parties' earnings of approximately
$3,000 per month were used to cover all general family expenses and the
inheritance was spent on home remodeling materials about two weeks after
it was received. Tracing does not require a party to produce the serial num-
bers of the dollar bills used."'' Noting that "[slimply routing the funds
through the joint account 'does not transform non-marital property into mari-
tal property,' " the court of appeals held that the trial court's denial of a
credit for the wife's nonmarital interest was clearly erroneous.
132
In Danielson v. Danielson, '33 the Minnesota Court of Appeals determined
that the wife had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had
contributed $23,024 in nonmarital funds to the marital home. 134 The wife
introduced an exhibit which showed both the amount of her nonmarital
funds (primarily from certificates of deposit) as well as the children's Social
Security funds used for improvements." 3 She further demonstrated that she
periodically cashed certificates of deposit to pay for the improvements,
which could not have been made without her contributions. 136 The court,
citing Nash, held that the wife had met both her burden of tracing and her
burden of showing that a proportion of the marital estate was her separate
property. ' 311 Conversely, the husband was not awarded farm machinery as
his sole and separate property because he did not show that the machinery
127. See MINN. STAT. § 518.54(5) (1988).
128. 388 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
129. Id. at 781.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Montgomery v. Montgomery, 358 N.W.2d 169, 179
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
133. 392 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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he had brought into the marriage had been exchanged for the couple's pres-
ent machinery.'
38
The importance of establishing intent was clearly illustrated by the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals in In re Marriage of Pate. 131 One of the issues in
Pate was whether the trial court erred in failing to classify as marital prop-
erty certificates of deposit purchased with money from a joint checking ac-
count.'4 At trial, the husband presented uncontradicted evidence that at
the time of the marriage, he had approximately $128,000.141 The wife en-
tered the marriage with an account of $2,000. 142 After the marriage, the
husband deposited money in the joint account and then purchased certifi-
cates of deposit, most of which he held in his name.' 43 The court of appeals
held that it was not error to regard the certificates of deposit as the hus-
band's separate property.'" The court emphasized that the husband rebut-
ted the presumption that property was marital, where "[t]he whole impact of
the [husband's] testimony was that he did not have any intention at any time
to transfer ownership of his premarital assets to the [wife] but did intend to
afford her the use thereof." '145 The wife testified that she did not know that
she was a joint owner of the account.' 46 Under these circumstances, the
court awarded the certificates of deposit to the husband.147
Both the cases addressing joint titling and those considering commingling
are consistent with the spirit of the MDA because they deemphasize the
importance of title. By giving greater weight to the parties' intent, as evi-
denced by their actions, recordkeeping practices, and testimony, the courts
free themselves to consider each marriage-and its dissolution---on a case-
by-case basis. Moreover, because the decisions reward accurate bookkeep-
ing, they are analogous to partnership accounting actions, in which the
courts implement every presumption against partners who fail to keep
proper records. 148
138. Id. at 573.
139. 591 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
140. Id. at 386.
141. Id. at 389.
142. Id.





148. See, e.g., Von Seggern v. Von Seggern, 196 Neb. 545, 244 N.W.2d 166 (1976) (burden
on plaintiff to establish right to credit); Hurst v. Hurst, 1 Ariz. App. 603, 405 P.2d 913 (1965)
(continuing partner's deposits of partnership and personal funds in his personal account are
partnership asset where that partner fails to distinguish his personal funds).
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III. DATE OF VALUATION
Another issue that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not
addressed is the date on which property should be valued. Separate but re-
lated questions include the cut-off date used for determining inclusion in the
marital estate and whether to consider one of the section 16-910(b) factors
when determining the "state of the partnership" at the time property was
acquired. To determine the proper date of valuation, the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals must define the phrase "during the marriage" as used
in section 16-910.1'9 Consistent with the partnership analogy, the date of
permanent separation should be used both for valuation and inclusion
purposes.' 50
Some authority for arguing that the phrase "during the marriage" should
be defined as "prior to separation" is found in Powell v. Powell. , " The par-
ties in Powell married in 1974 and separated in 1979.152 The wife filed for
divorce in February 1980, and the husband filed a counterclaim six months
later.1 5 3 The parties owned a total of 182 shares of IBM stock.'5 4 Prior to
separation, the wife held sixteen of those shares in her name and jointly
owned a single share with her husband.'5 5 Between the time of separation
and the time of divorce, the wife purchased the additional 165 shares
through an employment plan that allowed stock acquisition in lieu of ten
percent of her salary.' 6 The trial court divided the seventeen shares equally
between the parties and awarded the wife the remaining 165 shares.' 57 On
149. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
150. Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not yet defined the phrase
"during the marriage," see infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text, at least one court has
used the period from marriage to the divorce decree as the measure. In Barbour v. Barbour,
464 A.2d 915 (D.C. 1983), the issue before the court was whether civil service pension benefits
constituted marital property under § 16-910(b). The trial court held that they were marital
property and awarded the wife 50% of her husband's pension benefits that were earned during
the marriage. Id. at 917-18. In determining the amount, the court divided the number of
years of the marriage by the number of years of service creditable to the pension. Id. at 918.
The Barbours were married in 1952, separated in 1964 and divorced in 1981, and the court
used 29 as its basis for calculation, thus measuring the length of the marriage from the date of
marriage to the date of divorce. Id. at 917. The same method of calculation was used by the
court in McCree v. McCree, 464 A.2d 922, 925 n.2 (D.C. 1983), decided same day as Barbour-
see also Murville v. Murville, 433 A.2d 1106 (D.C. 1981) (major assets to be distributed pursu-
ant to D.C. Code § 16-910 was marital home, "the assessed value of which was $35,000 at the
time of trial.").
151. 457 A.2d 391 (D.C. 1983).
152. Id. at 392.
153. Id.
154. Id.




Catholic University Law Review
appeal, the husband contended that the trial court erred in finding the 165
shares to be wife's sole and separate property rather than marital property
subject to equitable distribution. 5 8 However, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals affirmed the award, holding that the trial court properly
applied the law and considered all factors relevant to equitable distribu-
tion."5 9 After reviewing the record, the court of appeals stated that the trial
judge correctly found that the stock was an asset accumulated during the
marriage.' 6
A significant point in Powell is the trial court's statement that "the equi-
ties [in favor of the wife] are much stronger after separation."'1 61 Thus, even
though the court of appeals was not called upon to define the phrase "during
the marriage" and did not fix a date for valuing the property, it did uphold
the trial court's decision to award stock acquired after separation but prior
to divorce to the wife. Moreover, the court of appeals did not criticize the
trial court's statement that the equities favored the wife after separation.
Powell is consistent with the purpose of the MDA. The husband, in Pow-
ell did nothing to acquire the 165 shares; the partnership/marriage did not
even exist at the time of acquisition. The contrary result would encourage
parties to quickly file a divorce action and proceed to trial in order to avoid
the situation where, although separated, they add to the marital estate.
Thus, the current rule unintentionally discourages separations that may re-
sult in reconciliation. Treatment of the fruits of labor after separation as
marital property penalizes parties who unsuccessfully attempt to reconcile.
The New Jersey Supreme Court probably has given the issue of date of
valuation more consideration than any other court. Beginning with Painter
v. Painter, 162 the court flatly rejected a literal reading of the term "during the
marriage" and held that the filing of the complaint, rather than the divorce,
should govern valuation. The court has modified the rule in numerous cases
since Painter and has developed a common-sense policy for both valuation
and inclusion that rewards both the partnership while it is a viable entity,
158. Id.
159. Id. Under § 16-910(b), factors to be considered are:
duration of the marriage, any prior marriage of either party, the age, health, occupa-
tion, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, assets, debts,
and needs of each of the parties, provisions of the custody of minor children, whether
the distribution is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of
each for future acquisition of assets and income.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910(b).
160. Powell, 457 A.2d at 393.
161. Id.
162. 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
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and individual industry once the partnership has effectively dissolved.' 63
Furthermore, recent decisions in Virginia,'"6  Pennsylvania,1 6  Alas-
163. See Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 371 A.2d 1 (1977) (date of the separation agreement
controlling as to both inclusion and valuation if the parties have a separation agreement that
could qualify as a property settlement and is fair and equitable); see also DiGiacomo v.
DiGiacomo, 80 N.J. 155, 402 A.2d 922 (1979) (date of the oral property settlement controls
where parties orally agreed upon fair and equitable property settlement and executed it); Carl-
sen v. Carlsen, 72 N.J. 363, 371 A.2d 8 (1977) (companion case to Smith); Borodinsky v.
Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 447, 393 A.2d 583, 583 (1978) ("the termination date for
determining eligible assets is also the date for valuation of those assets"). In Brandenburg v.
Brandenburg, 83 N.J. 198, 416 A.2d 327 (1980), the New Jersey Supreme Court then reviewed
its earlier decisions and stated:
In the absence of a qualifying separation agreement, the date a complaint is filed will
fix the termination date of a marriage for purposes of equitable distribution. If the
parties have entered into a written separation agreement accompanied by actual
physical separation, the date of the agreement will terminate the period of acquisition
of distributable assets. If the parties have separated in fact and divided their property
pursuant to an oral agreement, assets acquired afterwards are not eligible for equita-
ble distribution.
Id. at 209-10, 416 A.2d at 333 (footnote omitted); see also Portner v. Portner, 93 N.J. 215, 460
A.2d 115 (1983) (complaint used to determine the termination date of the marriage must be
that complaint which actually results in the final divorce decree); Raspa v. Raspa, 207 N.J.
Super. 371, 504 A.2d 683 (1985) (date of filing complaint used where parties separated within
marital home by maintaining separate bedrooms and no separation agreement existed).
164. The Virginia legislature amended its statute, addressing the date of inclusion, twice in
three years. In 1983, § 20-107.3(A)(2) of the Virginia Code defined marital property as all
jointly titled property and "all other property acquired by either spouse during the marriage
which is not separate property." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107-3(A)(2) (1983). The statute fur-
ther stated the following presumption: "All property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage is presumed to be marital property in the absence of satisfactory evidence that it is
separate property." Id.
The statute was amended in 1984 to make the presumption applicable to that "property
acquired by either spouse during the marriage, and before the filing of a bill of complaint
stating a ground for dixiorce." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Supp. 1985).
Pursuant to the 1986 amendment, the current version of the Virginia Code states: "All
property ... acquired by either spouse during the marriage, and before the last separation of
the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intends that the separation be
permanent, is presumed to be marital." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Supp. 1987); see
also Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905 (1987) (discussing statutory amendments).
Despite the fact that the statute appears to clarify the inclusion question, it does not address
the date of valuation issue. In this regard, the Price court recently noted that, although the
date of last separation is the most appropriate for inclusion, the evidentiary hearing or trial
date may be the most practical for valuation. The court further noted, however, that the trial
courts must be flexible and choose the valuation date on a case-by-case basis "since both fortui-
tous or intentional events can drastically affect values and equities between date of classifica-
tion and valuation." Id. at 232, 355 S.E.2d at 910.
165. The issue before the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Sergi v. Sergi, 351 Pa. Super. 588,
506 A.2d 928 (1986), was the trial court's use of the hearing date rather than the separation
date for valuation purposes. The subject of dispute was the marital home, in which the parties'
equity was $22,765.00 at the date of separation and $39,500.00 at the time of the hearing. Id.
at 595, 506 A.2d at 932. The court upheld the trial court's use of the hearing date but specifi-
19881
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ka, 166 and Montana1 67 either upheld trial court decisions to value marital
cally declined to establish a valuation date to be used in every situation. Id. at 592, 506 A.2d
at 930. The court recognized that there were logical arguments in favor of using the separation
date. The court rejected the argument that it should follow Pennslyvania's divorce code,
which excepts from the definition of marital property that property acquired after separation
until the divorce date. Id. The court stated that the date of inclusion under that section is
distinct from the date used for valuation purposes. Id,; see also Winters v. Winters, 355 Pa.
Super. 64, 512 A.2d 1211 (1986) (hearing date used for valuation); Braderman v. Braderman,
339 Pa. Super. 185, 488 A.2d 613 (1985) (pension valued at hearing date); King v. King, 332
Pa. Super. 526, 481 A.2d 913 (1984) (same). But see Smith, 72 N.J. at 350, 371 A.2d at 1;
Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. at 437, 393 A.2d at 583; Barnhart v. Barnhart, 343 Pa. Super. 234,
494 A.2d 443 (1985) (trial court erred in not including value of pension as marital property
even though no longer existing at time suit filed; Sergi notes that date of separation in this case
would be appropriate valuation date).
The concurring judge in Sergi would have the court establish a rule stating that "in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances, the date for valuing marital property is the date on
which the parties separate." Sergi, 351 Pa. Super. at 601, 506 A.2d at 935 (Wieland, J., con-
curring). The concurrence reasoned that using the separation date will be fair, encourage par-
ties to settle their property rights promptly, and allow parties to pursue their separate lives
without concern over how their endeavors will be affected in a future property distribution.
Id. The concurring judge concluded, however, that the circumstances in Sergi were "excep-
tional" so as to warrant valuation at the hearing date. Id. at 602, 506 A.2d at 935-36.
166. The Supreme Court of Alaska recently interpreted the meaning of "during the mar-
riage" for inclusion purposes in Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986). That court
stated:
As a general rule, we hold that property accumulated with income earned after a
final separation that is intended to, and does in fact, lead to a divorce is excluded
from the category of marital property, as long as it is obtained without the invasion
of any pre-separation marital asset. We decline to specify, as a matter of law, that
the effective date when such earnings become severable from marital property is at
separation or at filing for divorce. Each case must be judged on its facts to determine
when the marriage has terminated as a joint enterprise.
Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). The court accepted the husband's suggestion that the date the wife
filed her complaint for divorce was a reasonable cut-off point for inclusion. Id. While the
court's decision to determine each case on its particular facts was'made in the context of
inclusion rather than valuation, the court later noted that the property should have been val-
ued on the same date as the date used for inclusion, and remanded to the superior court for
calculations. Id. at 5; see also Burcell v. Burcell, 713 P.2d 802 (Alaska 1986) (no abuse of
discretion where trial court relied on date of permanent separation for division of property and
award of interest). But see Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1981) (valuation of prop-
erty as of date of divorce upheld where not clear that marriage was irretrievable on date of
separation).
167. The Supreme Court of Montana considers each situation on a case-by-case basis and is
unwilling to create a standard rule for valuation. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hunter, 196
Mont. 235, 639 P.2d 489 (1982). In Lippert v. Lippert, 627 P.2d 1206 (Mont. 1981), the court
held that there is no single event in the dissolution process that establishes the date for valua-
tion of marital assets because a court might need to use different valuation dates for different
properties. Id. at 1208. In In re Marriage of Krause, 200 Mont. 368, 654 P.2d 963 (1982), the
Montana Supreme Court reiterated the principles of Lippert, stating that there is no single
event in the dissolution process that is determinative of the valuation date, and it is preferable
to value assets at the time of distribution. Id. at 379, 654 P.2d at 968.
In In re Marriage of Wagner, 679 P.2d 753 (Mont. 1984), however, the Montana Supreme
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property as of the date of separation or have specifically recognized it as a
benchmark date.1 68 It appears that the trend is toward a flexible approach
that allows the trial court to determine the valuation date based upon the
circumstances presented in each case.
A review of other states' consideration of the matter illustrates the sound
reasoning behind valuing property as of the date of a separation culminating
in divorce, particularly where, as in the District of Columbia, the statute
derived from the UMDA. First, it is consistent with the view of marriage as
a partnership. 169 As with any other type of joint undertaking, shared prop-
erty should include assets acquired by the joint efforts of the parties who
Court found that the trial court had "abused its discretion by failing to evaluate the marital
assets as of the date of separation. Id. at 759. After the Wagners separated, the wife left the
family ranch and "aggressively" involved herself in a successful new business venture, while
the husband terminated the parties' ranch operation, liquidated the livestock and increased the
loan encumbering the ranch. Id. at 755. The parties' financial status had thus undergone a
drastic change between separation and dissolution. The Wagner court noted that while it gen-
erally used the date of dissolution for valuation of assets, the unusual facts of the case merited
deviation from that rule. Id. at 758. The court stated "under the circumstances of this case
the date of valuation of marital assets should have been the date of separation when, in fact,
the marriage was irretrievably broken and individual business practices had not yet altered the
financial status quo of the parties." Id. at 758-59. The court faulted the trial court because it
"essentially rewarded the husband for encumbering the family ranch and penalized the wife
for her ambitious effort after the broken marriage to negotiate her own independent financial
security." Id. at 759.
168. Other states that have left the proper date to the judge's discretion are Iowa, see In re
Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1981) (holding that it is not appropriate for the
court to develop general rule and distinguishing earlier cases holding that trial date is proper
valuation date) and Ohio, see Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St. 2d 318, 432 N.E.2d 183 (1982). But
see Dobbyn v. Dobbyn, 57 Md. App. 662, 471 A.2d 1068 (1984). In Dobbyn, one of the issues
before the Maryland Court of Special Appeals was whether the chancellor erred in using the
date the divorce action was filed for the purpose of valuing marital property consisting of
stocks, securities, bonds options, commodities, and reserve funds. Although the parties had
agreed that for purposes of inclusion they would use the date the complaint was filed, the
appellate court held that the trial court erred in using the date of filing for valuation purposes.
Id. at 666, 471 A.2d at 1074. The court looked to previous cases where it had held that a
marriage is not considered terminated until the date of the decree and noted that it made sense
to interpret the phrase "during the marriage" as meaning "the time between the commence-
ment of the marriage and its dissolution by death, annulment or the issuance of a decree of
absolute divorce." Id. at 667, 471 A.2d at 1075. The court then looked to the preamble to the
Marital Property Act and noted that the statute was meant to operate with precision and
efficiency. Id., 471 A.2d at 1075. While noting "the exceedingly difficult and tedious technical
assessment of financial aspects in this particular matter," the court nevertheless felt that the
purposes of the statute were best served by determining value as of the date of the decree of
divorce, based upon the evidence produced at trial. Id.; cf Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md.
App. 487, 495, 497 A.2d 485, 495 (no error in valuing property as of date trial ended rather
than date of divorce decree where only one month difference), cert. denied, 305 Md. 107, 401
A.2d 845 (1985).
169. See Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 355, 371 A.2d 1, 7 (1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 65
N.J. 219, 223, 320 A.2d 496, 501-02 (1974).
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undertook the endeavor. The argument that it is difficult to determine when
a marriage irretrievably breaks down (i.e. when the joint venture collapses) is
unfounded when one party is seeking a contested divorce pursuant to section
16-904 of the MDA. In that case, the court will have to make findings of
fact as to the date of separation and determine whether the period of separa-
tion has been continuous.
An adoption of the date of separation would also encourage productivity
and independence. Valuing marital property on the separation date rewards
industry by encouraging the lower salaried party to seek more lucrative em-
ployment. Moreover, it will encourage both parties to advance their invest-
ments without fear that their only reward will be a court order to split the
proceeds with a former spouse. Using the date of separation also will dis-
courage a particularly acrimonious spouse from dissipating the marital as-
sets prior to trial and will not reward a party's poor investments and faulty
judgment. 170
Furthermore, valuation of property as of the separation date virtually
eliminates the chance for a spouse to manipulate the court system. If the
court adopts the date of filing the complaint, a party can watch for fluctua-
tions in stock and file at the precise moment when that stock has reached its
peak value. If the court adopts either the date of trial or decree, a party
could request a continuance of trial until some future date at which the
change in property values would benefit his or her interest. This would not
only burden the court's already crowded dockets, but might also present
ethical problems for an attorney who otherwise is prepared for trial. 17 1
Finally, use of the separation date for valuing marital property will pro-
mote judicial economy. While the District of Columbia does not routinely
schedule pretrial conferences in contested divorce trials, use of the separa-
tion date would enhance the value of holding a pretrial conference because
the parties would have facts and figures readily available at that time. Even
if there were no formal pretrial conference, advance valuations would force
parties to focus on property issues earlier in the process and facilitate prompt
settlement of claims. Finally, using the separation date would eliminate the
court's need to take matters under advisement. If on the day of trial the
parties present valuation calculations based on the date of separation, no
need exists for the parties or the court to update the information, avoiding
delay.
170. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wagner, 679 P.2d 753, 758-59 (Mont. 1984); Sergi v. Sergi,
351 Pa. Super. 588, 591, 506 A.2d 928, 932 (1986).




The District of Columbia has not adequately addressed the issue of
whether to classify loan proceeds as sole and separate property or as marital
property. In Bowser v. Bowser, '72 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
briefly addressed the treatment of loan proceeds in an equitable distribution
context. In Bowser, the trial court had divided the parties' $25,000 equity in
the marital home. 73 Despite the fact that the wife's contributions "far out-
weighed" the husband's contributions, the trial court awarded him
$10,000.174 The court of appeals found no support for this award, but noted
that the fact that the parties had taken out a $10,000 loan for home improve-
ments could support the equity award "only if there [was] evidence that the
loan proceeds went into the property and that Mr. Bowser had paid the loan
or was solely responsible for paying the loan.'" 75
The court of appeals considered sole liability on a loan as a factor under
section 16-910(b) in Benvenuto v. Benvenuto. 176 In Benvenuto, the superior
court awarded the jointly titled home entirely to the husband.' 77 The court
of appeals upheld the award where the evidence showed that the husband
alone was obligated to repay his mother for the loan for the house, and
neither spouse had made significant monetary contributions either to finance
or to improve the house. 17
8
However, neither of these cases has considered whether to classify the pro-
ceeds from a loan as an asset under the MDA and, if so, how to determine
the classification of such an asset. The issue of how to classify credit acquisi-
tions during marriage recently was addressed by the California Court of Ap-
peal in In re Marriage of Grinius.179 California law presumes that all
property acquired during the marriage is community property. However,
"the character of credit acquisitions during marriage is 'determined accord-
ing to the intent of the lender to rely upon the separate property of the pur-
chaser or upon a community asset.' "180 The Grinius court reviewed the
"intent-of-the-lender" rule and created the following standard: "[l]oan pro-
ceeds acquired during marriage are presumptively community property;
however, this presumption may be overcome by showing the lender intended
172. 515 A.2d 1128 (D.C. 1986).
173. Id. at 1130.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 389 A.2d 795 (D.C. 1978).
177. Id. at 797.
178. Id. at 798.
179. 166 Cal. App. 3d 1179, 212 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1985).
180. Id. at 185-86, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (citing In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App.
3d 446, 455, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979)).
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to rely solely upon a spouse's separate property and did in fact do so.'' 18
Texas applied a similar rule in Mortenson v. Trammell, "2 where the court
held that a spouse could rebut the presumption that any loan made to a
spouse during the marriage is a community obligation with "clear and satis-
factory evidence that the creditor agreed to look solely to the separate estate
of the contracting spouse for satisfaction."'1 3 In Mortenson, the wife bor-
rowed money from a bank, using as collateral a certificate of deposit that
was her sole and separate property.' 8 4 On the same day, she loaned the
money to her daughter and received a secondary vendor's lien and deed of
trust as collateral.'8 5 The loan agreement stated that payment was to be
made to both the wife and her husband. 186 The court noted that the creditor
intended to satisfy the debt from the wife alone by requiring her certificate of
deposit as collateral and would have looked to the wife for repayment of the
debt in case of default. 187
The Supreme Court of Idaho adopted a more expansive view in Winn v.
Winn 18 when it stated that the intent of the spouses is paramount, and "[i]f
there exists between the spouses an actual, articulated intent that the obliga-
tion be separate or community in character, that intent shall control." 189 In
the absence of such an intent, the court suggested that it will review factors
such as the liability of the community for the loan, the basis of credit on
which the lender relies in making the loan, the nature of the down payment,
the names on the deed, and which spouse signed the documents of indebted-
ness.' 90 According to the court, no single factor is dispositive because
"[s]uch an approach is too rigid in light of [the] ultimate purpose of deter-
mining the likely intent of the spouses and in consideration of the highly
individualistic and often complex fact situations presented."' 91
The District of Columbia should adopt a rule wherein the entity taking
the risk receives any benefits from it. Such a standard would be consistent
with partnership principles. If a loan is made to an individual, that individ-
ual alone is responsible for repayment. If the couple does not offer marital
property as collateral, no benefit should accrue to the partnership. Con-
181. Id. at 1187, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 809-10.
182. 604 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
183. Id. at 275.
184. Id. at 276.
185. Id. at 275-76.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 276.
188. 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411 (1983).
189. Id. at 814, 673 P.2d at 414.




versely, if the partnership assumes the risks of liability, it also should reap
the benefits.
V. INCREASES IN SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY
By its explicit terms, section 16-910(a) of the MDA provides that "any
increase" in a sole and separate asset also is sole and separate property.192 A
convincing argument can be made that the term "any increase" should be
construed to mean just that-namely, an increase from whatever source and
in whatever manner. First, a cardinal principle of statutory construction is
that a court should not look behind the plain meaning of a statutory provi-
sion.' 93 Moreover, the District of Columbia courts have strictly interpreted
section 16-910. In Hemily v. Hemily, 9 4 the court noted that in order for
property to be exempt from equitable distribution, it must have been ac-
quired in a way enumerated under section 16-910(a). Otherwise, it is section
16-910(b) property. Thus, if an asset qualifies under section 16-910(a) in the
first instance, the increase in value also is sole and separate property; to hold
otherwise would render the phrase "any increase" meaningless.
Other jurisdictions faced with the issue of classifying increases in sole and
separate property have distinguished between whether the increase results
from passive factors or from the active involvement of either spouse. The
current trend by many state courts is to hold that passive increases-those
caused by inflation, appreciation or other market forces not attributable to
either party's efforts-in sole and separate property are themselves sole and
separate, unless the nondebtor spouse can prove that he or she contributed
to the increase. 95
Although the Maryland marital property statute has no provision regard-
ing the increase of separate property, it has followed the current trend. In
192. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910(2) (1981); see also supra note 2.
193. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 472 (1917) ("IT]he meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if
that is plain ... the sole function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms."); Marshall
v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm'n, 533 A.2d 1271 (D.C. 1987) (applying
principle).
194. 403 A.2d 1139, 1143 n.3 (D.C. 1979).
195. 'See, e.g., In re Marriage of Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); see also Bent-
ley v. Bentley, 84 Ill. 2d 97, 417 N.E.2d 1309 (1981); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App.
487, 497 A.2d 485, cert. denied, 305 Md. 107, 501 A.2d 845 (1985); Van Newkirk v. Van
Newkirk, 212 Neb. 730, 325 N.W.2d 832 (1982); Palmer v. Palmer, 7 Ohio App. 3d 346, 455
N.E.2d 1049 (1982); Mothershed v. Mothershed, 701 P.2d 405 (Okla. 1985); Templeton v.
Templeton, 656 P.2d 250, 252 (Okla. 1982); Elam v. Elam, 97 Wash. 2d 811, 650 P.2d 213
(1982); In re Marriage of Johnson, 28 Wash. App. 574, 625 P.2d 720 (1981); Plachta v.
Plachta, 118 Wis. 2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1984).
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Rosenberg v. Rosenberg,196 one of the issues on appeal was whether the trial
court erred in holding that a substantial increase, over the course of a thirty
year marriage, in the value of the husband's interests in a family business
acquired through gifts and bequests were the husband's separate property.' 97
The court found that while the husband was a member of the board of direc-
tors of one corporation and both corporations were family businesses, the
wife did not prove that the husband's personal efforts contributed, either
directly or indirectly, to the increase in the husband's interests. 198 Rather,
the court noted that the increase in value was attributable to, inter alia, the
increase in value and earnings of the companies' subsidiaries, and factors
that generally affected the business, such as the oil embargo and shortage of
the 1970's.199 Rosenberg conforms with other Maryland decisions holding
that an increase in nonmarital stock that is attributable mostly to market
factors is separate property."°° In Maryland, the burden is on the nontitled
party to prove that the increase in value of the separate property is not pas-
sive.2°1 Additionally, the fact that the titled spouse is an owner or employee
of a company is not dispositive.2 °2
Some jurisdictions have addressed the classification of increases in sole
and separate property in their marital property statutes.2 °3 Of these statutes,
Minnesota's statute is most similar to section 16-910 of the MDA because it
196. 64 Md. App. at 487, 497 A.2d 485, cert. denied, 305 Md. 107, 501 A.2d 845 (1985).
197. Id. at 501, 497 A.2d at 491-92.
198. Id. at 530, 497 A.2d at 506.
199. Id., 497 A.2d at 507.
200. See Wilen v. Wilen, 61 Md. App. 337, 486 A.2d 775 (1985) (split of nonmarital stock
and increase in value of nonmarital stock remains nonmarital); Mount v. Mount, 59 Md. App.
538, 476 A.2d 1175 (1984) (stock dividend received by husband in wholly owned subsidiary of
corporation of which husband was 10% owner and employee held separate property); Schwe-
izer v. Schweizer, 55 Md. App. 373, 462 A.2d 562 (1983), aff'd and remanded, 301 Md. 626,
484 A.2d 267 (1984) (increase in value of separate stock in corporation, where husband on
board of directors, remains separate property); cf Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 447 A.2d
847 (1982) (trailers added by efforts of wife to trailer park gifted to husband held marital
property).
201. See, e.g., Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. at 530, 497 A.2d at 506.
202. See, e.g., id. at 530-31, 497 A.2d at 506.
203. In New York and Kentucky, for example, the increase in value of property acquired
prior to the marriage is considered separate property to the extent that such increase did not
result from the efforts of the parties during the marriage. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.190(2)(e) (Mitchie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW art. I I-A, pt. B(l)(d)(3)
(McKinney 1986). Other states specifically include income from the separate property, see,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(1)(iii) (1983), or only
include the increase in value of that property acquired prior to the marriage. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34.1214(B) (1947); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(2) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1514(b) (1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(a) (1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.




broadly includes as separate property the increases in all types of separate
property. 2° Despite the plain language of the Minnesota statute, however,
the court, in Nardini v. Nardini,205 held that the increase in the value of
separate property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during the
marriage is marital property, and the increase in value of nonmarital prop-
erty attributable to inflation or to market forces or conditions remains
separate.
The issue before the court in Nardini was the classification of the family
business. 2 ' The husband owned fifty percent of the business prior to the
marriage and the parties purchased the other half during the marriage.20 7
The trial court awarded one half of the present value of the business to the
husband as marital property.2 ° s The court of appeals reversed, noting that
although the statute appeared straightforward in stating that the increase in
value of nonmarital property also is nonmarital, the statute "seem[ed] out of
harmony with the modem definition of property as a bundle of rights.
2 9
Among the inadequacies in the statute noted by the court of appeals was its
failure to offer direction in resolving complex property issues and, specifi-
cally, its failure to distinguish between active and passive increases.
2 '0
In the court's decision in Nardini, an important factor used to distinguish
between active and passive increases stemmed from earlier Minnesota deci-
sions apportioning marital and nonmarital interests in assets purchased with
separate funds, and improved or paid off with marital funds.21 ' Because
contributions of labor to nonmarital property constitute marital property,
the court held in Nardini that any increase in value attributable to either
spouse's labor should be marital, but any increase in value attributable to
inflation or market forces retains separate character.21 2
This reasoning embraces the partnership theory of marriage espoused by
the UMDA and recognizes that the active efforts and contributions of either
party, whether financial or otherwise, are all important factors in producing
a profitable marriage. Because assets, the product of a marriage, are the sum
total of all of the contributions made to it, each party has a continuing inter-
204. MINN. STAT. § 518.54(5) (West 1988).
205. 414 N.W.2d 184 (Minn. 1987).
206. Id. at 184.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 187.
209. Id at 191.
210. Id.
211. See Faus v. Faus, 319 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1982); Brown v. Brown, 316 N.W.2d 552
(Minn. 1982); Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1981); Quinlavin v. Quinlavin, 359
N.W.2d 276 (Minn. App. 1984).
212. 414 N.W.2d at 191-92.
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est in those assets and a right to them at dissolution.2" 3
Not surprisingly, the modem trend toward distinguishing between active
and passive increases in sole and separate property parallels the emergence
of the source of funds rule as the preferred method of classifying a hybrid
asset. Both theories are based upon partnership principles and strive to re-
ward each individual's contribution as a partner, while simultaneously pre-
serving individual achievements. This active/passive distinction not only
makes sense as a modem trend, but also is consistent with the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals holding in Brice v. Brice.2 14 In Brice, the court
stated that "disproportionately high payments for home maintenance and
household expenses by one spouse may create an equitable interest in real
property acquired prior to the marriage and held in the name of the other
spouse. '215 Applying the Brice test, the court in Darling v. Darling216 held
that the wife's extensive contributions to her husband's earnings gave her an
equitable interest in the business. 2 7 Therefore, under Brice and Darling, an
increase in sole and separate property could be reclassified as marital if the
nontitled spouse meets his or her burden of showing disproportionate and
substantial contributions to the asset. If that burden is met, the court reclas-
sifies as marital property not only the increase, but also the underlying asset
itself. The active/passive distinction is similar, but is a more reasonable rule
because it allows classification of the increase as marital and allows the titled
spouse to retain the underlying asset as his or her sole and separate property.
VI. CONCLUSION
If a marriage in the District of Columbia is to be viewed as a partnership
while it endures, it also must be viewed as a partnership during dissolution.
213. In Nardini,. the court stated:
"The concept of equitable distribution is a corollary of the principle that marriage is
a joint enterprise whose vitality, success and endurance is dependent upon the con-
junction of multiple components, only one of which is financial.... [T]he extent to
which each of the parties contributes to the marriage is not measurable only by the
amount of money contributed to it during the period of its endurance but, rather, by
the whole complex of financial and nonfinancial components contributed. The func-
tion of equitable distribution is to recognize that when a marriage ends, each of the
spouses, based on the totality of contributions made to it, has a stake in and right to a
share of the marital assets accumulated while it endured, not because that share is
needed, but because those assets represent the capital product of what was a partner-
ship entity."
Id. at 192 (quoting Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d 975, 977 (Sup. Ct.
1983)).
214. 411 A.2d 340 (D.C. 1980).
215. Id. at 343.
216. 444 A.2d 20 (D.C. 1982).
217. Id. at 24.
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In order to accomplish this, practitioners and trial judges will have to take
positions consistent with these principles. Clearly the most important step
will be for the court to examine the source of funds rule, or at least some
version of it, whereby the parties' resources, both financial and otherwise,
are applied in the proper proportion to the marital venture. Credit must be
given where credit is due, and the court should not embrace artificial pre-
sumptions too tightly; the rule of reason should prevail. In other words,
courts should construe the near unfettered discretion already given by the
MDA to trial judges more broadly, allowing them to consider the tracing of
assets, the intent and extent of commingling, the scope of transmutation, and
similar questions. Once they adopt a comprehensive classification scheme,
the answers to other questions, such as the role of transmutation and the
classification of increases and loan proceeds, will be readily apparent.
As a late bloomer in the marital property area, the District of Columbia
has a wealth of precedent from other jurisdictions to follow. If marriage is
indeed a partnership then courts should be free to fully determine the contri-
butions of partners based on activities of each individual-as wage earner,
homemaker, family maker or breaker-without undue influence from a rigid
reading of the Act. The laws in this and other jurisdictions have come a long
way in the last ten years. Courts in the District of Columbia have ample
precedent to create decisional law in this area that reflects the modern view
of marriage as a partnership.
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